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I. INTRODUCTION 
The violence in the Syrian war continues unabated after the most 
recent effort by the United States and Russia to facilitate a partial cease-
fire failed.2 The conflict, now entering in its sixth3 year, has exacted an 
immense toll on the people of Syria. Approximately half the Syrian 
population has been forced to leave their homes, including 4.9 million 
refugees who have fled to nearby Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and 
Egypt.4 Millions in Syria require humanitarian aid, many of them 
children.5 Unemployment has risen dramatically6 and life expectancy has 
dropped approximately 20 years.7  
The humanitarian tragedy caused by the Syrian war makes attempts to 
characterize the conflict a seemingly abstract and irrelevant exercise. 
However, classifying the conflict is not just an academic endeavor; it is a 
condition precedent in determining the legal responsibilities and 
obligations of those engaged in the hostilities. By clearly identifying 
these rights and duties, conflict participants are put on notice that they 
are bound by the well-established humanitarian principles embedded 
within the law of armed conflict and responsible for any violations. 
Classifying the Syrian hostilities is therefore a critical first step towards 
  
 2. See, e.g., Anne Barnard, Cease-Fire in Syria Crumbles as Government 
Airstrikes Kill Dozens in Northwestern Town, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2016, at A9 (stating 
that the partial cease-fire has “crumbled” and the goals of the “chief international 
sponsors of the talks, the United States and Russia, have dissipated.”). 
 3. See Richard Johnson, Visualizing the 220,000 Lives Lost in Syria, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 29, 2015), http://www. washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/syria-220000/. 
 4. Syria Regional Refugee Response, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php (last updated Apr. 6, 2017). 
 5. Syria Overview, WORLD BANK, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/overview (last visited May 23, 2015).    
 6. Id.  
 7. Lucy Westcott, Syrian Life Expectancy Drops Over 20 Years in Four Years, 
NEWSWEEK (Mar. 11, 2015, 4:37 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/03/27/syrian-
life-expectancy-drops-two-decades-four-years-313145.html. 
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reducing the brutality of the conflict and ensuring accountability for 
those participants who ignore their legal obligations.  
In hopes of promoting both humanity and accountability this article 
intends on answering the question: what type of conflict is taking place 
in Syria? To conduct this analysis it is important to understand the 
political history of Syria and thus the article begins with a brief historical 
background section. Sections on the various state and non-state actors 
battling within Syria as well as a general overview of how conflicts are 
classified under international law follows. The article concludes with a 
classification determination for the Syrian hostilities and a reminder that 
all parties to the conflicts are obligated to comply with the law of armed 
conflict.   
II. BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT CONFLICT 
A. A Brief Overview of Syria’s Political History 
Understanding Syria’s political history is essential to fully 
comprehend the modern conflict. The area now known as Syria was 
under Ottoman rule until World War I.8 Following the empire’s collapse, 
the League of Nations created a mandate recognizing Syria, which was to 
be ruled temporarily by France before final recognition of independence.9 
Thus began 26 years of French rule, categorized by heavy-handed 
military occupation and forced regime changes.10  
The British forced the French out of power in 1941.11 The period 
following independence was tumultuous for the Syrian government, with 
a series of military coups and ousted dictators.12 In 1970, Hafez al-Assad, 
father of the current leader Bashar al-Assad and then Defense Minister, 
seized power.13 Assad, a member of the Alawi religious minority and the 
  
 8. William R. Polk, Understanding Syria: From Pre-Civil War to Post-Assad, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/ 
understanding-syria-from-pre-civil-war-to-post-assad/281989. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
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socialist Baath party,14 eventually held a referendum that solidified his 
position as president.15  
Assad’s approach to governance was greatly informed by his 
affiliation with the Baath party which originated from a liberal student 
ideology developed in opposition to French rule.16 The underlying 
ideological basis of the movement was unity and particularly the valuing 
of “Arabism” above all other dividing factors, including religious 
sectarianism.17 It also endorsed modern secular values, including rights 
for women.18 In primary opposition to the Baath Party in Syria was the 
conservative Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic movement which espoused 
the idea that Syria must be a Sunni Muslim nation.19 Indeed, a majority 
of the population was and is currently Sunni, and many Sunnis consider 
the Alawis, of which the al-Assad family belongs, to be heretics.20  
The Assad regime forcefully cracked-down on opposition groups.21 
The Muslim Brotherhood led an uprising against the government in 
1982.22  In response, the regime suppressed the opposition with violence, 
culminating in the seizure of the city of Hama, headquarters of the 
Muslim Brotherhood.23 Under orders from Assad, the Syrian military 
killed between 10,000 and 20,000 people, many of them innocent 
civilians, during the siege.24 
Al-Assad died in 2000 and his son Bashar became president by 
referendum vote.25 Bashar al-Assad inherited an authoritarian regime 
which was known to have pervasive corruption.26 Many Syrians hoped 
that the new regime would usher in a period of reform, and in the months 
  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See Deborah Amos, 30 Years Later, Photos Emerge from Killings in Syria, 
NPR (Feb. 2, 2012, 12:41 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/02/01/146235292/30-years-
later-photos-emerge-from-killings-in-syria.  
 22. Id.  
 23. DAVID W. LESCH, SYRIA: THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF ASSAD 7 (2012). 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. at 3–4.  
 26. Id. at 5.  
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following Bashar’s ascendency to the presidency, the country saw a rise 
in more open political discourse.27 What some have called the 
“Damascus Spring” of 2000–2001, however, was quickly curtailed by 
the younger Assad, who had authorities arrest dissenting intellectuals and 
political activists.28 Assad further alienated Syria’s Sunni workers and 
peasantry through his economic policies that disproportionately 
benefitted elite Alawis who were close to him.29 With only 13% of the 
population being Shia, Ismaili or Alawi Muslim30 this special treatment 
of the Alawis disenfranchised the majority of the population and further 
destabilized the country.31  
B. Other Contributing Factors to the Conflict 
The political history of Syria is an important root cause of the current 
conflict. However, there are a number of other contributing factors that 
have led to hostilities. These include environmental problems, economic 
instability, and regional unrest. Each of these is described in more detail 
below. 
i) Drought/ Economic Instability Prior to Arab Spring 
Syria is a relatively small country—about the size of Washington 
State—whose economy struggled under both Hafez and Bashar al-
Assad.32 Prior to 2011, the government’s efforts at economic reform had 
increased economic growth—between 2004 and 2009, Syria’s growth 
rate averaged approximately 5.7%.33 However, the country’s relative 
economic well-being was vulnerable to both unexpected external and 
internal pressures, including the global financial crisis, a population 
  
 27. AMNESTY INT’L, SYRIA: SMOTHERING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: THE 
DETENTION OF PEACEFUL CRITICS 3–4 (2002), available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/ 
documents/MDE24/007/2002/en/. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Christopher Phillips, After the Arab Spring: Power Shift in the Middle East?: 
Syria’s Bloody Arab Spring, LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI. 37, 38 (2012). 
 30. The World Factbook: Syria, U.S. CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html (last updated January 12, 2017). 
 31. See Phillips, supra note 29, at 38.  
 32. LESCH, supra note 23, at 6.  
 33. Syria Overview, supra note 5.  
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boom and long-term droughts which affected its limited cropland.34 
Gross Domestic Product was approximately $5,000 per capita prior to 
2006, but because of the almost four-year drought, fell to approximately 
$2,900 in 2010.35 The drought conditions unequally burdened Syrians in 
rural areas who depended on agriculture to survive.36 Many rural Syrians, 
especially in the eastern part of the country, migrated to larger cities as a 
result of the poor agricultural prospects, fueling already tense 
employment competition in those crowded areas.37 
ii) Arab Spring – Domino Effect 
In December 2010, a Tunisian fruit vendor named Mohammed 
Bouazizi set himself on fire to protest perceived corruption and injustices 
perpetrated by the Tunisian government.38 A wave of unrest ensued in 
that country and quickly spread to Algeria, Jordan, Egypt and Yemen.39 
It directly led to the ousting of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt.40 
Ideological aims differed by country, but disaffected Arabs were 
primarily targeting political and economic alienation, despotic rule, and 
government corruption.41 Building momentum after early successes, the 
Arab Spring spread further to include Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iran and other 
countries.42  
Until 2011, opponents of the Assad regime had mostly refrained from 
public demonstrations.43 Empowered by the recent events in Tunisia and 
Egypt, however, dissenters became more vocal and began imitating the 
  
 34. Id.  
 35. Polk, supra note 8.  
 36. See id. (stating that over “800,000 farmers…los[t] their entire livelihood[s,] 
and …85 percent of livestock died”). 
 37. See Syria Overview, supra note 5. 
 38. Marc Fisher, In Tunisia, Act of One Fruit Vendor Sparks Wave of Revolution 
Through Arab World, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/in-tunisia-act-of-one-fruit-vendor-sparks-wave-of-revolution-through-arab-
world/2011/03/16/AFjfsueB_story.html. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Marc Lynch, The Big Think Behind the Arab Spring, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 
28, 2011), http://foreignpolicy.com /2011/11/28 /the-big-think-behind-the-arab-spring/. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Phillips, supra note 29, at 38. 
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language and tactics of protesters elsewhere in the Arab world.44 
Demonstrators used Facebook, YouTube and Twitter to organize and 
used slogans borrowed from other uprisings to demand regime change.45  
iii) Syrian Uprising 
The widespread demonstrations seen during the Arab Spring coupled 
with the collapse of other dictatorial regimes emboldened the Syrian 
opposition to begin their own internal protests.46 These protests 
eventually led to armed violence as the Syrian government responded 
with heavy-handed tactics in an effort to quell the reform uprising.47 
When protests demanding reform reached the town of Deraa, in southern 
Syria, Assad’s security forces countered with violence, killing 
hundreds.48 Demonstrators had been protesting the government’s arrest 
and inhumane treatment of several local children accused of writing anti-
regime graffiti on a school building.49 In a speech before parliament later 
in 2011, Assad refused to apologize for the incident or offer conciliatory 
reforms.50 Syrian forces opened fire on the increasing number of 
protesters, and violence snowballed as funerals for slain demonstrators 
became a catalyst for even more protests.51 The government’s violent 
crack-down on dissent prompted the further radicalization of the 
opposition, and riots broke out throughout the country.52 Rebels split into 
a myriad of militarized opposition groups and violence between these 
emerging groups and Syrian forces increased dramatically.53 Since 2011, 
many rebel groups have been joined by foreign fighters and supported by 
foreign state funding. The internal chaos has also created a vacuum for 
emerging groups such as the Islamic State, which has made major 
  
 44. Id.  
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 37. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Joe Sterling, Daraa: The Spark that Lit the Syrian Flame, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com /2012 /03/01/world/meast/syria-crisis-beginnings/ (last updated Mar. 
1, 2012, 9:32 AM). 
 50. Phillips, supra note 29, at 38.  
 51. Id. at 39.  
 52. Id.  
 53. See LESCH, supra note 23. 
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inroads within Syria in the past several years. Over 220,000 people have 
been killed since the beginning of the conflict.54  
III. ACTORS IN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR 
The fighting in Syria has evolved into a chaotic clash between 
numerous state and non-state armed groups. This confusing landscape 
makes classifying the conflict exceedingly difficult.55 It is therefore 
important to understand the major players in the hostilities in order to 
properly classify the conflict. A short description of the actors 
participating in the hostilities follows. 
A. Free Syrian Army 
Defecting Syrian army officers formed the Free Syria Army (FSA) in 
2011.56 The FSA has evolved into an umbrella organization which 
includes many Syrian rebel groups—most under the direction of the 
Supreme Military Council, a Syrian militant rebel leader group.57 The 
Supreme Military Council, in turn, has strong ties to the Syrian National 
Council—essentially a Syrian rebel provisional government in exile, 
located in Turkey.58 The Syrian National Council was established in 2011 
in an attempt to win international support for Syrian rebels.59 The FSA is 
composed of thousands of fighters, mostly Sunni Arabs, and has a fairly 
structured chain of command.60 Most of the groups comprising the FSA 
are considered moderate rebels, and the U.S. and other nations have been 
  
 54. Johnson, supra note 3. 
 55. See generally Prosecutor v. Tadiü, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (highlighting the 
difficulty of prosecuting individuals when an internal and international armed conflict are 
taking place simultaneously). 
 56. Phillips, supra note 29, at 40. 
 57. See Aron Lund, A New Free Syrian Army Leadership, CARNEGIE 
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Apr. 14, 2014), 
http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=55245.  
 58. See Phillips, supra note 29, at 40. 
 59. Id. at 39. 
 60. Lund, supra note 57.  
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providing financial, arms, and training support to them for several 
years.61   
The U.S. has assisted in arming factions within the FSA since 2012, 
both indirectly and later directly—including small arms and antitank 
missiles.62 The U.S. has also provided the FSA with hundreds of millions 
of dollars of non-lethal aid, including medical kits, food and vehicles.63 
In 2013, the U.S. established a covert training site in Jordan64—and later 
in Qatar65 and Turkey66 to train fighters. Details on these training sites are 
understandably scarce, and it is unclear how many rebels have been 
trained in total. Officials did state that fewer than 1,000 rebels were 
trained in 2013.67 The training has been conducted by members of the 
CIA’s Special Activities Division, an organization that recruits heavily 
from former U.S. Special Operations forces, and included training on 
basic military skills.68 In May 2015, 400 rebels were being trained at the 
Jordanian site by the U.S., with the assistance of the British and French, 
for the primary purpose of combating ISIS.69 Although, with the fluid 
  
 61. Julian Borger & Nick Hopkins, West Training Syrian Rebels in Jordan, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 8, 2013, 9:31 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/08/ 
west-training-syrian-rebels-jordan. 
 62. See id.; see also Ellen Knickmeyer et. al., Advanced U.S. Weapons Flow to 
Syrian Rebels, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2014, 7:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
advanced-u-s-weapons-flow-to-syrian-rebels-1397862200?tesla=y. 
 63. Mark Landler, U.S. Considers Resuming Nonlethal Aid to Syrian Opposition, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/10/world/middleeast/syria-
aid-may-resume-despite-fears-over-where-it-will-go.html. 
 64. Borger & Hopkins, supra note 61.  
 65. Nancy A. Youssef, Syrian Rebels Describe U.S.-Backed Training in Qatar, 
PBS (May 26, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/foreign-affairs-
defense/syria-arming-the-rebels/syrian-rebels-describe-u-s-backed-training-in-qatar/. 
 66. Jim Sciutto et al., U.S. Training of Syrian Rebels Set to Begin, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/06/politics/khaled-khoja-free-syrian-army-u-s-support/ (last 
updated May 7, 2015, 6:45 PM). 
 67. Greg Miller, CIA Ramping Up Covert Training Program for Moderate Syrian 
Rebels, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/cia-ramping-up-covert-training-program-for-moderate-syrian-
rebels/2013/10/02/a0bba084-2af6-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Ben Jacobs & Sabrina Siddiqui, U.S. Begins Training Syrian Rebels in 
Jordan to Become Anti-ISIS Force, GUARDIAN (May 7, 2015, 13:42), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/07/us-begins-training-syrian-rebels-jordan-
anti-isis-force. 
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nature of the conflict in Syria, it seems likely that these groups will also 
put their western training to use against regime-backed forces as well.  
The U.S. has also joined with other nations to support the FSA. The 
U.S., Saudi Arabia,70 Turkey and Qatar71 helped the FSA develop 
logistical routes for moving supplies to rebels in Syria, and provided 
training in communications.72 These countries have also established a 
base of operation in Turkey, close to the Syrian border, where they 
coordinate intelligence and communication support efforts for the 
rebels.73  
Despite its reputation as a moderate rebel group, the FSA has faced 
serious allegations of wartime misconduct. Human Rights Watch has 
accused elements of the FSA of using children as fighters,74 kidnapping 
civilians,75 and conducting indiscriminate shelling of populated areas.76 
  
 70. The Saudi Arabian government has been a major supporter of the FSA. See 
Mariam Karouny, Saudi Edges Qatar to Control Syrian Rebel Support, REUTERS (May 
31, 2013, 3:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-syria-crisis-saudi-
insight-idUSBRE94U0ZV20130531. 
 71. The Qatari government has also been a primary source of funding and arms 
for rebel groups, some sources estimating that the small state has provided billions total. 
See, e.g., David Blair, Qatar and Saudi Arabia ‘Have Ignited Time Bomb by Funding 
Global Spread of Radical Islam,’ TELEGRAPH (Oct. 4, 2014, 10:23 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11140860/Qatar-and-Saudi-
Arabia-have-ignited-time-bomb-by-funding-global-spread-of-radical-Islam.html. 
Although it is difficult to trace which groups have benefitted from Qatar’s support—
Qatari-supplied arms have been used by the more extreme al-Nusra groups—some have 
clearly gone to FSA factions. See Mark Mazzetti et al., Taking Outsize Role in Syria, 
Qatar Funnels Arms to Rebels, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/world/middleeast/sending-missiles-to-syrian-rebels-
qatar-muscles-in.html. 
 72. Jay Solomon & Nour Malas, U.S. Bolsters Ties to Rebels in Syria, WALL ST. 
J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303410404577464763551149048  
(last updated June 13, 2012, 9:10 PM). 
 73. Mark Hosenball, Exclusive: Obama Authorizes Secret U.S. Support for 
Syrian Rebels, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2012, 5:58 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/ 
08/01/us-usa-syria-obama-order-idUSBRE8701OK20120801. 
 74. Syria: Armed Groups Send Children into Battle, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 22, 
2014, 8:50 PM), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/22/syria-armed-groups-send-
children-battle.  
 75. Syria: Armed Opposition Groups Committing Abuses, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Mar. 20, 2012, 1:33 PM), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/20/syria-armed-opposition-
groups-committing-abuses.  
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As of 2015, the FSA’s manpower has deteriorated significantly, as many 
fighters have deserted to join more radical groups such as ISIS and 
Jabhat al-Nusra (now Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham).77  
B. Islamic Front  
In late 2013, seven Islamist rebel groups combined to form the 
Islamic Front. These groups included the Suqour al-Sham, Liwa al-
Tawhid, Jaish al-Islam, Ahrar al-Sham, Ansar al-Sham, Liwa al-Haqq 
and the Kurdish Islamic Front—representing both extremist Islamic 
militants, and more moderate Islamists and Kurds.78 The Islamic Front 
appears to be in the middle of the rebel ideological spectrum, more 
conservative than the FSA, but not as radical as Jabhat al-Nusra (now 
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham) or ISIS.79 They have had multiple clashes with 
other rebel groups, ISIS, and Syrian forces.80 Evidence of foreign state 
funding for this group is scarce, and the group most likely depends 
largely on private support.81 
C. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra)  
This radical group has roots in Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and was 
instrumental in organizing jihadist cells in Syria, beginning in late 
2011.82 After breaking alliance with AQI, al-Nusra pledged support to Al 
  
 76. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “HE DIDN’T HAVE TO DIE”: INDISCRIMINATE 
ATTACKS BY OPPOSITION GROUPS IN SYRIA 70–71 (2015).  
 77. Erin Banco, Four Years Later, the Free Syrian Army Has Collapsed, INT’L 
BUS. TIMES, (Mar. 14, 2015, 9:14 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/four-years-later-free-
syrian-army-has-collapsed-1847116. 
 78. See Loveday Morris, Seven Syrian Islamist Rebel Groups Form New Islamic 
Front, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/ 
seven-syrian-islamist-rebel-groups-form-new-islamic-front/2013/11/22/8a504da6-53bc-
11e3-9ee6-2580086d8254_story.html. 
 79. Aron Lund, The Politics of the Islamic Front, Part 1: Structure and Support, 
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Jan. 14, 2014), 
http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=54183.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (Formerly Jabhat al-Nusra), MAPPING MILITANT 
ORGS., http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/493  (last 
updated Mar. 27, 2017). 
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Qaeda (AQ).83 As a result, al-Nusra was designated as a terror group by 
the U.S. and faced sanctions by the U.N.84 In an effort to soften its image, 
al-Nusra rebranded itself as al-Sham in August 2016.85 Despite the new 
name, al-Sham remains essentially the al-Nusra that has had violent 
encounters with Hezbollah, elements of the FSA, and the Syrian Armed 
Forces.86 It does control areas of Syria, and has instituted some forms of 
governmental functions in those areas, including food distribution, health 
care, trash collection, and control over utilities.87  
Next to ISIS, al-Sham has recruited the majority of foreign fighters 
among all rebel groups in Syria.88 The majority of these foreign fighters 
originated in the Middle East, but some have come from Chechnya, 
Europe, Australia and the U.S.89 Al-Sham reportedly has a consistent 
ability to procure weapons, funding and fighters from foreign donors.90 
In 2013, Iraq accused the government of Qatar of funding then al-
Nusra.91 Qatar vehemently denied the allegation, but recent reports in 
2015 indicate that Qatari Intelligence officials met with group leadership 
  
 83. Id.  
 84. Mariam Karouny, Insight – Syria’s Nusra Front May Leave Qaeda to Form 
New Entity, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2015, 6:43 AM), 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/03/04/uk-mideast-crisis-nusra-insight-
idUKKBN0M00G620150304. 
 85. See Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, Al-Qa’ida Uncoupling: Jabhat al-Nusra’s 
Rebranding as Jabhat Feteh al-Sham, MIDDLE EAST FORUM (Aug. 22, 2016), 
http://www.meforum.org/6219/jabhat-alnusra-rebranding (“The nominal decoupling of 
the organizations was approved and coordinated with al-Qa’ida’s senior leadership and 
was designed to unify Islamist efforts in Syria and to make it more difficult for the United 
States and Russia to justify targeting the group.”). 
 86. MAPPING MILITANT ORGS., supra note 82.  
 87. See Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Phillip Smyth, How Syria’s Jihadists Win 
Friends and Influence People, ATLANTIC (Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/how-syrias-jihadists-win-
friends-and-influence-people/278942/ (noting that these efforts may have been sporadic 
and greatly exaggerated by the group on social media in an effort to gain popular 
support). 
 88. MAPPING MILITANT ORGS., supra note 82. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Blake Hounshell, Iraq Accuses Qatar of Financing Jihadi Groups in Syria, 
FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 4, 2013, 6:39 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/04/iraq-
accuses-qatar-of-financing-jihadi-groups-in-syria/. 
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to encourage severing ties with al-Qaeda, in a plan to provide funding for 
the organization.92  
It is difficult to map the areas of Syria controlled by rebel groups such 
as the FSA, Islamic Front, and al-Sham, as there are many factions 
within those umbrella organizations.93 The groups are spread throughout 
the region and are not geographically contiguous.94 In contrast, it is easier 
to determine the territory controlled by ISIS as it is the exclusive group 
in many areas of Syria and Iraq.95  
D. ISIS  
The Islamic State (formerly AQI), also known as the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS or ISIL), is a militant Islamic organization primarily 
located in Syria and Iraq. It has a highly organized command structure 
and collects enough revenue from its conquered areas to make it one of 
the richest terror organizations in history.96 The group’s purpose is to 
establish a caliphate, or a political and religious Islamic state which 
transcends country boundaries.97 It has controlled sizeable areas of both 
Iraq and Syria98 and has created a system of government within some of 
those areas.99 Indeed, an important strategy of ISIS is their attempt to 
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 93. Aron Lund, The Political Geography of Syria’s War: an Interview with 
Fabrice Balanche, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=58875. 
 94. See id. 
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 96. How ISIS Works, N.Y. TIMES, 
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(last updated Sep. 16, 2014). 
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 98. See Syria: Mapping the conflict, BBC (July 10, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22798391. See also Jack Moore, After 
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from a high of forty percent in 2014).  
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establish long-term governance within geographic areas it has seized, to 
include providing public utilities, health care, education, security and 
food.100 It is difficult, however, to assess the success of these efforts.101  
ISIS has been involved in numerous violent incidents with various 
rebel Syrian factions, Kurdish groups, the Syrian military, and 
Hezbollah. It is a violent and extremist group, responsible for 
intentionally killing thousands of civilians, including conducting public 
beheadings of prisoners.102 It has kidnapped and subsequently held for 
ransom numerous foreign journalists and aid workers in Syria.103 ISIS 
has also incensed the international community by selling numerous 
captured historical artifacts on the black market104 and blatantly 
destroying cultural landmarks.105 The CIA estimates that the group has 
20,000-31,000 fighters in its ranks in late 2014, mostly in Iraq and 
Syria—many of whom are foreign recruits.106 The U.S. and other allies 
began conducting airstrikes against ISIS in Syria in 2014, and the 
international coalition currently includes dozens of nations.107  
E. Kurdish Popular Protection Units (YPG & SDF) 
Unaffiliated in the conflict, the Kurdish people constitute the largest 
stateless nation in the world, their population divided among Turkey, 
Iraq, Iran and Syria.108 Over one million currently reside in Syria, where 
they have faced years of ethnic discrimination and economic alienation 
  
 100. Id. at 68.  
 101. Id. at 69–70.  
 102. Id. at 87.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 61.  
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TIMES (Sep. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/world/europe/turkey-is-a-
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 107. For a comprehensive list of coalition partners and their contributions see 
Ashley Fantz, Who’s doing what in the coalition battle against ISIS, CNN, 
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 108. KERIM YILDIZ, KURDS IN SYRIA: THE FORGOTTEN PEOPLE 5 (2005).  
2017] Classifying the Syrian War under the Law of Armed Conflict 569
under the Syrian government.109 The Kurdish Popular Protection Units 
were created as independent, secular groups devoted to defending the 
Kurdish north.110 These units have been involved in battles with both 
rebel groups and Syrian forces in efforts to repel incursions into Kurdish 
territory.111 They currently control sections of northeast Syria,112 and 
have recently been joined by U.S. airstrikes in repelling ISIS from the 
area.113 Although there is still fragmentation among the Kurdish groups 
in Syria, the YPG and their political affiliates have established local 
courts, passed laws, and coordinated oil revenues—effectively exercising 
control over this discrete area of Syria in the absence of the Syrian 
government—with the seeming goal of creating an independent Kurdish 
state.114  
F. Syrian Armed and National Defense Forces (NDF) 
Assad’s conventional forces numbered over 250,000 prior to 2011, 
but have dwindled to 125,000 after almost six years of fighting, due to 
casualties and desertions.115 Unconventional forces and militias number 
about 125,000.116 The Syrian military is accused of committing multiple 
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 110. Aron Lund, Syria’s Kurdish Army: An Interview with Redur Khalil, 
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Dec. 25, 2013), 
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Piece of Syria, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 12, 2014, 8:52 PM), http://www.wsj. 
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east-22798391.  
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City Kobani, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 26, 2015, 7:26 PM), 
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 114. Dagher, supra note 112.  
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(Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/world/middleeast/an-eroding-
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war crimes including arbitrary arrest, torture and indiscriminate killing.117 
Furthermore, the Syrian Armed Forces have used chemical weapons and 
barrel bombs against rebel groups and civilians throughout the conflict, 
tactics which have outraged the international community.118  
G. State and Non-State Allies of Syria: Russia, Iran, & Hezbollah 
The Syrian government receives support from Russia in the form of 
arms, armored vehicles, communications and surveillance equipment, 
drones, guided missiles, and in-country military advisors.119 Starting in 
September 2015, after a request from the Syrian government, Russian 
troops began supporting Assad’s forces directly—conducting both air 
and ground operations.120 Russia has targeted elements of Al-Sham, the 
FSA, ISIS, and other rebel groups.121 In March 2016, President Vladimir 
Putin stated that he was removing the main part of his force from Syria, 
as his troops had largely accomplished Russia’s objectives.122 It is 
unclear how many Russian troops remain in the country.  
Iran also provides significant support to the regime. Since hostilities 
began in 2011, the Iranian government has purportedly sent billions in 
monetary aid,123 arms, technology124 and its own Revolutionary Guard to 
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assist Assad’s troops.125 Additionally, Iran-assisted foreign fighters have 
supported the Syrian government.126 These are almost exclusively 
members of the pro-Iranian Lebanese militant group Hezbollah.127 Long 
an ally of Assad’s Baath party, Hezbollah has provided thousands of 
fighters to bolster the Syrian state military.128 
H. U.S. and other International Actors 
As noted above, the U.S. has been equipping Syrian rebel groups 
since at least 2012. Jordan, France and the U.K. have joined with the 
U.S. to establish training areas for non-Islamist rebels in Jordan.129 The 
U.S. and coalition partners, including the U.K, France, Australia, 
Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E. began conducting 
airstrikes against ISIS in Syria in 2014, targeting personnel, equipment 
and buildings.130 The U.S. has also targeted the Khorasan Group, a group 
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of extremists from Al-Sham and Al Qaeda.131 Despite initial reluctance 
by the Obama administration to involve any American troops in the 
ground conflict, the U.S. has sent a limited number of special operations 
forces to Syria.132 By spring 2016, there were approximately 300 
American military personnel in the country, supporting domestic groups 
involved in the fight against ISIS.133 In April 2017, in response to the 
Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons against civilians, the U.S. 
military carried out airstrikes against a Syrian base.134  Dozens of 
Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired at the airfield, in an attempt to 
destroy Syrian aircraft and infrastructure, thereby disrupting the regime’s 
ability to use chemical weapons.135  Russian aircraft were not affected by 
the strike, according to U.S. officials.136  This was the first time that the 
U.S. had used force against the Syrian government during the duration of 
the six-year war.137   
Turkey has also played an important role in the Syrian conflict, 
having been involved in numerous border engagements with Kurdish 
forces and ISIS.138 Syria downed a Turkish jet  in 2012 after an incursion 
into Syrian airspace, significantly raising tensions between the 
countries.139 Some sources state that Turkey has fired mortars toward 
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Syrian army positions across the border.140 Turkey also shot down 
several Syrian aircraft for invading Turkish airspace.141 In November 
2015, Turkey downed a Russian military jet near the Turkish-Syrian 
border, killing one of the pilots.142 Although U.S. and Turkish officials 
have stated that the jet did cross briefly into Turkey’s airspace, Russia 
has continued to deny the allegation.143  
Finally, Israel has conducted airstrikes in Syria since the start of the 
conflict.144 Israel has attempted to limit their involvement by targeting 
exclusively Hezbollah and Syrian military assets.145 It has primarily done 
retaliatory strikes against mortar and gunfire originating from the Syrian 
border in the Golan Heights146 and has shot down a Syrian jet after it 
allegedly crossed into Israeli airspace.147  
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I. Summary 
The broad spectrum of non-state and state actors engaged in Syria 
discussed above makes classifying the conflict under the traditional 
LOAC normative framework obviously challenging.148 Further 
complicating attempts to characterize the hostilities in Syria  is the 
historic resistance of states to acknowledge that internal fighting or 
situations of violence within their territory may amount to a non-
international armed conflict. Yet, the ongoing intra-state violence 
between Syria’s armed forces and a variety of non-state armed groups 
coupled with the hostilities between rival non-state armed groups makes 
it very likely the violence has crossed the threshold to be deemed a non-
international armed conflict. Further, the variety of state actors involved 
in Syria makes the violence increasingly internationalized and thus 
potentially an international armed conflict. It is therefore important to 
understand how the law of armed conflict classifies conflicts in order to 
properly characterize the Syrian hostilities.  
IV. A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT CLASSIFICATION 
A. Why International Law Classifies Conflicts 
The law of armed conflict,149 which is primarily rooted in 
international conventions and customs,150 is not an abstract or arcane 
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body of law.151 Rather, these rules—”which . . . protect[] persons who are 
not or are no longer participating in the hostilities[,] . . . restrict[] the 
means and methods of warfare”152 and regulate the unruly and potentially 
horrid aspects of an armed conflict.153 It does this by striking a delicate 
balance between military necessity and humanity.154 “This equilibrium 
permeates the entirety of [the law of armed conflict], thereby ensuring 
  
example, international humanitarian law does not “include the law of neutrality.” Id. It is 
also important to note that the laws governing warfare fall into two general categories: jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) notes 
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force in general; jus in bello governs the conduct of belligerents during a war, and in a 
broader sense comprises the rights and obligations of neutral parties as well.” Robert 
Kolb, Origin of the Twin Terms Jus Ad Bellum/Jus In Bello, 320 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 
553, 553 n.1 (Oct. 31, 1997).  
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d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and 
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law.  
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), Oct. 24, 1945. 
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ARMED CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH 112 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Bus. 
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that force is applied on the battlefield in a manner allowing for the 
accomplishment of the mission while simultaneously taking appropriate 
humanitarian considerations into account.”155 
As a threshold matter, it is important to understand that an armed 
conflict will trigger the applicability of this specialized area of 
international law.156 While there is not a definitive definition of the term 
“armed conflict”157 it is broadly understood to “exist[] whenever there is 
a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or 
between such groups within a State.”158 In contrast, situations of violence 
not defined as an armed conflict are governed by international human 
rights law and the domestic law of the territorial State. If an armed 
conflict does exist, it is questionable whether the law of armed conflict 
applies in its entirety or only in part. By way of illustration, there are 
only combatants and prisoners of war in an international armed conflict 
or occupation whereas such categories with all of their rights and 
obligations do not apply to non-international armed conflicts. 
Accordingly, classifying a particular conflict is an important first step in 
determining the applicable law.  
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B. Classifying Conflicts: International or Non-International?  
The law of armed conflict “does not recognize a unitary concept of 
[warfare] . . . [and] recognizes [only] two types of armed conflicts: 
international and non-international.”159 As a matter of positive law, the 
differences between these two types of conflicts are significant, with 
those characterized as international far more heavily regulated than those 
classified as non-international.160 With customary international law, 
however, there is much less of a distinction; the state practice is to 
enforce most of the same rules regardless of how a conflict is 
classified.161 While there is undoubtedly a trend towards a greater 
convergence of the legal norms that regulate international and non-
international armed conflicts, the fundamental framework, structure, and 
application of the law remains rooted in the binary differentiation found 
in in the positive law. 162 
The law of armed conflict outlines the classification paradigm in 
Common Articles 2 and 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. These 
articles, often called “Common Articles” as they are repeated verbatim in 
all four the Conventions,163 establish the “law trigger for application of 
all treaty and customary international law related to their respective 
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 160. The overwhelming majority of treaty provisions applying to international 
armed conflicts provide a detailed set of rules regulating the conduct of hostilities and the 
protection of victims of war. By contrast, there are a limited number of treaties or articles 
in treaties regulating non-international armed conflicts. See Shane R. Reeves & David 
Lai, A Broad Overview of the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, in THE 
FUNDAMENTALS OF COUNTERTERRORISM LAW, 139, 142–44 (Lynne Zusman ed., 2014). 
 161. State practice has gone beyond existing treaty law and expanded the rules 
applicable to non-international armed conflicts. See Corn, supra note 157, at 75 
(describing the law regulating non-international armed conflicts as “expanding”). 
 162. See Yoram Dinstein, Concluding Remarks on Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, 88 INT’L L. STUD. 399, 406–07 (2013) (discussing the trend of convergence and 
explaining why a full merger is impossible). 
 163. There are roughly twelve such articles found in the Geneva Conventions. See 
GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN 
WAR, 84–85 (2010). 
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category of armed conflict.”164 For an international armed conflict the 
criteria are outlined in Common Article 2 which provides, in part, that  
[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of 
any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the 
High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by 
one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or 
total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the 
said occupation meets with no armed resistance.165 
This article, which replaces the concept of “war” with the more 
flexible notion of “armed conflict” as the triggering mechanism, greatly 
broadened the regulation of inter-state violence.166 Under Common 
Article 2, an international armed conflict exists when one state resorts to 
armed force against another regardless of the scope, intensity or duration 
of the violence.167 It is irrelevant “how long the conflict lasts, how much 
slaughter takes place, or how numerous are the participating forces[,]” as 
the detaining of a member of the enemy force is enough to trigger 
Common Article 2.168 As a result, the application of the law is no longer 
driven by anachronistic formal declarations of war but rather by “[t]he 
occurrence of de facto hostilities” between state actors.169 Further, the 
  
 164. Corn, supra note 157, at 74. 
 165. GC II, supra note 156, art. 2.  
 166. In terms of triggering an international armed conflict, the intensity and 
duration of the fighting is not controlling in terms of the characterization of the armed 
conflict. The application is triggered by two or more States using their armed forces 
against each other. See International Committee of the Red Cross, How is the Term 
“Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, INT’L COMM. OF THE 
RED CROSS 1–2 (2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-
conflict.pdf. 
 167. See Corn, supra note 157, at 74. 
 168. JEAN DE PREUX WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY FRÉDÉRIC, ET AL., COMMENTARY: III 
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 23 (1960), 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC_1949-III.pdf [hereinafter 
COMMENTARY, GC III] (“Even if there has been no fighting, the fact that persons covered 
by the Convention are detained is sufficient for its application. The number of persons 
captured in such circumstances is, of course, immaterial.”). 
 169. CORN, supra note 154, at 22–23. For those States that ratified Additional 
Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, those provisions supplement the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and expanded the definition of armed conflict to include those 
where “peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against 
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unilateral use of armed force by one state against another is sufficient to 
trigger an Article 2 conflict, even in the absence of an armed response 
from the second state.170  The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) takes an even broader view of what may constitute an 
international armed conflict, stating that a nonconsensual invasion by one 
state within the territory of another state – even if no force is directed 
towards the armed forces or government of the invaded state – may 
trigger  Common Article 2.171   
In contrast, a non-international or internal armed conflict is between 
governmental forces and non-governmental armed groups, or between 
various non-state actors within the geographic boundaries of a state 
  
racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination.” Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflict (Protocol I) art. 1(4), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 7 
[hereinafter AP I]. This provision provides for the application of laws of international 
armed conflict to a category of non-international armed conflicts. Moreover, the 
provision was a reflection of concerns for the types of conflicts being fought during that 
time frame. Akande, supra note 159, at 49. This expansion of the term “armed conflict” 
is one of the reasons the U.S. has not ratified the treaty. See BOVARNICK ET AL., LAW OF 
WAR DESKBOOK 21 (Brian J. Bill ed., 2010). However, the U.S. finds much of Additional 
Protocol I and II as customary international law and is therefore obligated to follow those 
specific provisions when an armed conflict is triggered. See generally Michael J. 
Matheson, Session One: The United States Position on the Relation of Customary 
International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in 
The Sixth Annual American Red-Cross Washington College of Law Conference on 
International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 
1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L & POLY’L 
415, 419 (1987).  
 170. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS COMMENTARY, I GENEVA CONVENTIONS FOR 
THE AMELIORATION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 81 (Knut 
Dorman et al. eds., 2016) [hereinafter COMMENTARY, GC I].  
 171. COMMENTARY, GC I. supra note 170. According to the ICRC, “an 
unconsented-to invasion or deployment of a State’s armed forces on the territory of 
another State – even if it does not meet with armed resistance – could constitute a 
unilateral and hostile use of armed force by one State against another, meeting the 
conditions for an international armed conflict under Article 2(1)” Further, “the use of 
armed force not directed against the enemy’s armed forces but only against the enemy’s 
territory, its civilian population and/or civilian objects . . . constitutes an international 
armed conflict for the purposes of Article 2(1).” Id.  
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actor.172 Different terms are used to describe such situations of internal 
armed violence including: civil wars, rebellion, revolution, terrorism, 
guerilla warfare, resistance, internal uprising, or war of self-
determination.173 Starting from the peace of Westphalia, which marked 
the inception of the modern sovereign States, until after World War II, 
international law exclusively regulated warfare between States.174 
However, with the drafting of the 1949 Geneva Conventions this 
changed as Common Article 3 began to regulate armed conflicts “not of 
an international character occurring in the territory of [a state.]”175   
Common Article 3, often called a “[c]onvention in miniature” as it 
applies exclusively to non-international armed conflicts and its 
participants,176 marked one of the most important innovations in the 1949 
Geneva Conventions.177 As noted, this was the first time legal regulation 
  
 172. “[A]rmed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory 
of one of the High Contracting Parties” is defined as a non-international armed conflict. 
GC II, supra note 156, art. 3.  
 173. EVE LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS 5 (2008).  
 174. See generally Prosecutor v. Tadiü, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). Until World War 
II the laws and customs regulating warfare could become applicable to a non-
international armed conflict of certain intensity through the so called doctrine of 
“recognition of belligerence.” Leslie C. Green, The International Judicial Process and 
the Law of Armed Conflict, in ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR 218 (1998). The 
doctrine of belligerence was the first attempt to define the characteristics of a civil war in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See LA HAYE, supra note 173, at 6 (discussing 
the four conditions needing to be satisfied before a state of belligerency could be 
recognized). In cases of a recognized belligerency international law categorized such 
conflicts as if they were a war between States. For more on the historic idea of 
belligerency see Rogier Bartels, Timelines, Borderlines and Conflicts: The Historical 
Evolution of the Legal Divide Between International and Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, 91 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 35, 50–52 (2009). 
 175. “[A]rmed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory 
of one of the High Contracting Parties” is defined as a non-international armed conflict. 
See, e.g., GC II, supra note 156, art. 3. “Non-international armed conflict generally 
arises, as the ICTY noted, ‘within a state’, although the conflict need not unfold, at least 
entirely, within one state’s geographic borders.” HELEN DUFFY, THE “WAR ON TERROR” 
AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 222 (2005). 
 176. COMMENTARY, GC III, supra note 168, at 34.  
 177. The other law of armed conflict treaties addressing non-international armed 
conflicts are Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See generally 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 
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of non-international armed conflict was contained in an international 
instrument.178 In practice, however, attempts to regulate civil wars are 
exceedingly difficult as there are no universal criteria for determining 
when internal violence has evolved into a “non-international armed 
conflict.”179 While there are a number of criteria that may indicate the 
difference between an “internal disturbance” and a non-international 
armed conflict, these are non-binding and not universally accepted.180  
Further confusing efforts to qualify an internal disturbance as a non-
international armed conflict, and therefore triggering the application of 
international law, are the different definitions of the term found in 
Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions181 and the statue 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC).182 Protocol II limits the 
applicability of the law to only those situations where “dissident armed 
forces or other organized armed groups which, [are] under responsible 
command, exercise . . . control over a part of” a state.183 Controlling 
sufficient territory from which to launch military operations is unique to 
the Additional Protocol II definition and, historically, a difficult criterion 
to meet for non-state armed groups.184 Furthermore, this view of non-
  
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]; See generally Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. Additionally, since 1949, there have 
been a number of treaties that applied to both international and non-international armed 
conflicts such as the Biological Weapons Convention, 1972; Chemical Weapons 
Convention, 1993; the Convention Prohibiting Anti-Personnel Landmines, 1997 among 
others. See generally Dinstein, supra note 162, at 30. 
 178. See LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 30 (2002).  
 179. The drafters of the Geneva Conventions wanted application of Common 
Article 3 to be as broad as possible. See COMMENTARY, GC III, supra note 168, at 36–37 
(“No Government can object to observing, in its dealings with enemies, whatever the 
nature of the conflict between it and them, a few essential rules . . . .”). 
 180. Id. The Geneva Conventions give a list of nonbinding criteria that include: 
the non-state armed group is an organized military force, under responsible command, 
with control of territory, respects the Law of Armed Conflict, and the state actor responds 
with their regular armed forces. Id. at 36. 
 181. Additional Protocol II supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions. See generally AP II, supra note 177, art. 1(2). Again, the U.S. has not 
ratified AP II but finds much of it as customary international law. See Matheson, supra 
note 169. 
 182. See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(f ), 
July 17, 1998, U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 183. AP II, supra note 177, art. 1.  
 184. See SOLIS, supra note 163, at 131.  
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international armed conflict only applies to the relations between a 
state’s armed forces and a non-state armed group; it does not apply, by 
its own wording, to non-state armed groups fighting against each other.185 
The ICC, on the other hand, only recognizes those internal conflicts that 
“take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed 
conflict between government authorities and organized armed groups or 
between such groups.”186 This lack of a clear or binding definition creates 
a blurry line between “isolated and sporadic act[s] of violence”187 and an 
internal armed conflict that makes knowing when international law 
applies a subjective decision.  
C.  Parallel, “Internationalized,” & Transitory Armed Conflicts 
While a conflict is assumed to be either international or non-
international, in practice this is rarely the case. Parallel armed conflicts, 
“internationalized” internal wars, and transitory conflicts are more 
common in contemporary warfare. Applying the law in these 
environments is challenging and is discussed briefly below.  
Parallel armed conflicts are those in which both an international and 
non-international armed conflict take place within a single state.188 For 
  
 185. ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
OF ARMED CONFLICTS 79 (2008). 
 186. Rome Statute, supra note 182, art. 8(2)(f ). See also INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS, ADVISORY SERVICE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, What is 
International Humanitarian Law? (2004), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/ 
what_is_ihl.pdf (last visited July 25, 2016) (“International humanitarian law applies only 
to [international or non-international] armed conflict; it does not cover internal tensions 
or disturbances such as isolated acts of violence. The law applies only once a conflict has 
begun, and then equally to all sides regardless of who started the fighting.”). 
 187. AP II, supra note 177, art. 1(2).  
 188. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 219 (June 27) (finding that both an international and 
non-international conflict were simultaneously taking place in Nicaragua). See also 
James Summers, Introduction to CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE LAW OF WAR: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR PETER ROWE 10 (Caroline Harvey et al. eds., 2014) 
(noting that a simultaneous international and non-international armed conflict was found 
to exist in Nicaragua as there were “hostilities between the Nicaraguan government and 
the Contra rebels within the country and external intervention by the USA.”). The 
International Criminal Court (ICC) came to a similar conclusion in the Uganda case. See 
Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment pursuant to Art. 74 of 
the Statute, ¶¶ 563–67 (Mar. 14, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/ 
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example, within the Ukraine there is currently the Russian occupation of 
the Crimea—defined as an international armed conflict189—and a non-
international armed conflict in the eastern portion of the country.190 
Obviously, the violence and the actors are inextricably linked in the 
Ukraine; however, only by viewing the occupation and civil war as 
separate conflicts is it possible to clarify the rights, duties, and 
responsibilities of the participants. This theoretical pulling apart of the 
conflicts thus allows for application of the law despite the confusing 
amalgamation of state and non-state actors involved in the fighting.191  
Perhaps an even more complicated calculation takes place when 
trying to determine if a foreign intervention in an ongoing civil war has 
“internationalized” the hostilities. International legal precedent, first in 
the Tadiü192 opinion and later confirmed by the ICC in the Lubanga193 
decision, holds that a non-international armed conflict can evolve into an 
international armed conflict if an external state sufficiently controls the 
rebel group participating in a civil war.194 While Tadiü created the 
“overall control” test to make these determinations,195 it left open the 
ability for states to influence internal armed conflicts without gaining 
  
CR2012_03942.PDF (stating that while Uganda’s occupation of Bunia airport in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo created an international armed conflict, there existed 
alongside a separate non-international conflict involving rebel groups in the region). 
 189. See GC II, supra note 156, art. 2. 
 190. Shane R. Reeves & David Wallace, The Combatant Status of the “Little 
Green Men” and Other Participants in the Ukraine Conflict, 91 INT’L L. STUD. 361, 383 
(2015) (“The occupation of Crimea and the non-international armed conflict in eastern 
Ukraine, though inextricably linked, remain best viewed as parallel international and non-
international armed conflicts.”). 
 191. See SOLIS, supra note 163, at 149 (discussing the significant practical and 
policy consequences flowing from battlefield determinations). 
 192. Prosecutor v. Tadiü, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (detailing how an internal armed 
conflict can become an international armed conflict). 
 193. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 (adopting the “overall 
control” test asserted in the Tadiü opinion). 
 194. The term “internationalized” non-international armed conflicts has also been 
used to describe hostilities between state and non-state groups occurring outside the 
territory of the state. See CORN, supra note 157, at 76. These extraterritorial conflicts are 
also often called “transnational.” See id. This paper uses the term to describe when a state 
actor has overall control over a rebel group. 
 195. Tadiü, No. IT -94-1-A at ¶ 137. 
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responsibility for the rebel group.196 States, for example, can provide 
“assistance to rebels in the form of provisions of weapons or logistical 
support”197 but cannot have a “role in organising, coordinating or 
planning the military actions of the military group.”198 The ambiguity of 
the Tadiü “overall control” test therefore leaves a state providing 
assistance to a rebel group “some elbow room before its actions” are 
such to have internationalized an internal armed conflict.199 
Finally, it is also possible for an international armed conflict to 
transition over time into a non-international armed conflict. These 
situations are generally easier to recognize than an “internationalized” 
internal armed conflict as they start with open violence between state 
actors and devolve into an insurgency. A classic example of a transitory 
armed conflict occurred in Iraq beginning in 2003.200 On March 10, 2003, 
the United States and its coalition partners invaded Iraq triggering an 
international armed conflict pursuant to Common Article 2 with the full 
corpus of the body of law applying.201 On May 1, 2003, major combat 
operations in Iraq ended202 and while an occupation began, there was no 
shift in the applicable law.203 However, when the occupation government, 
the Coalitional Provisional Authority, passed control of the Iraqi nation 
back to an interim Iraqi government on June 28, 2004204 the ongoing 
hostilities became a non-international armed conflict regulated by the 
more limited rule set that applied in that circumstance.205   
  
 196. See generally YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 221– 
24 (5th ed. 2011) (discussing the ambiguity of the “overall control” test). 
 197. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27). 
 198. Tadiü, No. IT -94-1-A at ¶ 137 (emphasis omitted). 
 199. See DINSTEIN, supra note 196, at 411.  
 200. See SOLIS, supra note 163, at 154. 
 201. Id.  
 202. Id. 
 203. It is important to note that even though the basis for the application of 
international law changed from an armed conflict to an occupation, the full corpus of the 
body of law still applied because both circumstances are governed by Common Article 2 
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See GC II, supra note 156, art. 2. 
 204. See SOLIS, supra note 163, at 154. 
 205. Id.  
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V. CLASSIFYING THE SYRIAN CONFLICT 
The Syrian conflict is described by some as the perfect depiction of 
the Hobbesian state of “‘war of all against all.’”206 With “[v]irtually all 
the world powers, almost all the countries in the Persian Gulf region, 
numerous rebel groups and militant Islamic extremist groups fighting in 
alliances with or against each other[,]”207 characterizing the conflict is a 
difficult endeavor. Yet this is possible by first determining if the violence 
in Syria qualifies as an “armed conflict” and, if so, analyzing the facts in 
order to characterize the hostilities as non-international, international or 
both. Once characterization is determined, the relevant law with its 
associated obligations and rights becomes apparent.  
A. Is Syria an Armed Conflict? If so, What Kind? 
While it may seem absurd to ask if the violence in Syria is an armed 
conflict, this determination is a necessity for triggering international 
law.208 As noted above, it is generally understood that an armed conflict 
exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States, or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups, or between such groups within a State.209 
Recognizing an armed conflict is not that difficult “when the armed 
forces of states engage in hostilities against each other.”210 However, 
assessing the existence of a non-international armed conflict is, as 
  
 206. Shahir Shahidsaless, It is Russia, not IS or al-Qaeda, that Poses Primary 
Threat to U.S., MIDDLE EAST EYE (Aug. 26, 2016, 11:06 AM), 
http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/it-russia-not-or-al-qaeda-poses-primary-threat-us-
1862428491. 
 207. Id.  
 208. See Corn, supra note 157, at 71 (“War, as a colloquial term, is routinely used 
to describe situations of armed hostilities. War is not, however, the defining condition 
that results in application of international legal conflict regulation. The trigger for 
applicability of this law is armed conflict, an international legal term. . . .”). 
 209. See supra notes 156–58 and accompanying text (defining the term “armed 
conflict”). 
 210. See Corn, supra note 157, at 72–73 (stating “neither duration nor intensity of 
such hostilities is relevant to the determination” as any fighting between state armed 
forces qualifies as an armed conflict). 
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discussed above, quite difficult.211 The internal conflict must be of an 
intensity to be deemed “protracted armed violence” and the non-state 
group must be sufficiently organized.212 While again there is no single 
factor in determining if a non-state group is organized, some indicators 
include: “the existence of a command structure[;]” disciplinary standards 
and mechanisms; “the existence of a headquarters;” group control of 
territories; “access to weapons [and] other military equipment[;] 
recruit[ing] and . . . training;” and coordinated military operations.213 It is 
also important to note that while organization is required for the non-
state group, it does not need to reach the same level as the military units 
of the State.214   
In applying this methodology to the situation in Syria, a triggering 
event happened on March 15, 2011 in Deraa when a small group of 
demonstrators gathered to protest the ill-treatment of students by the 
Assad regime.215 Notwithstanding the non-violent nature of the protests, 
government forces responded brutally by firing on the demonstrators, 
which led to scores of arrests, injuries, and deaths.216 While the response 
by the Assad regime was clearly an attempt to suppress any anti-
government protests, the excessive use of force had the opposite effect.217 
Over the following weeks and months, protests and unrest spread to other 
parts of Syria, and with increased participation the government responses 
became more violent.218  
By August 2011, peaceful protests all but ended in Syria and were 
replaced by a more organized violent insurgency.219 In response, the 
  
 211. See supra notes 166–71 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty in 
defining a non-international armed conflict). 
 212. See id.  
 213. Akande, supra note 159, at 28–29. 
 214. See Terry D. Gill, Classifying the Conflict in Syria, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 353, 
363–64 (2016) (noting that “a minimum degree of organization [is] sufficient”). 
 215. See generally Polk, supra note 8. 
 216. LOUISE ARIMATSU & MOHBUBA CHOUDHURY, THE LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF 
THE ARMED CONFLICTS IN SYRIA, YEMEN AND LIBYA 7 (2014). The government forces 
that participated in the attacks and arrests included the Syrian armed and security forces, 
the civilian police, and the Alawite civilian militia (Shabbiha). Id. 
 217. See ELAYNE HANNON & HANNAH RUSSELL, FROM PEACEFUL 
DEMONSTRATIONS TO ARMED CONFLICT: CONSIDERING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN 
THE CASE OF SYRIA 8 (2013). 
 218. See ARIMATSU & CHOUDHURY, supra note 216, at 7. 
 219. Id. at 8. 
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Syrian army and security forces launched large-scale military operations 
to suppress the anti-government forces by shelling densely populated 
areas, deploying tanks to various urban areas, and using heavy 
weaponry.220 The brutal response by the Syrian regime brought 
international political pronouncements and sanctions condemning the 
violence.221 As the savagery of the fighting increased, pleas for restraint 
were made, including by the leader of the ICRC delegation to Syria who, 
in April 2012, implored the regime and the anti-government forces to 
protect civilians trapped in the hostilities.222 Syrian President Assad 
publicly acknowledged the intensity of the violence when he openly told 
his new cabinet that “[w]e live in a real state of war from all angles.”223   
Since this pronouncement, the hostilities in Syria have progressively 
escalated. Clearly the fighting between the Syrian governmental 
authorities and the anti-governmental groups is protracted armed 
violence.224 What has complicated the characterization question is the 
myriad of actors—both state and non-state—who are involved in the 
Syrian conflict.225 As a general matter, governmental forces are presumed 
to meet the organizational criteria without a detailed analysis.226 In terms 
of non-state actors there are, by some accounts, as many as 1,000 armed 
groups.227 Some of the groups, like the FSA and ISIS, are well known. 
Others are small, disorganized, and extremely fluid. Finding reliable 
information on the size, command structure, specific functions and 
capacity to carry out military operations, even in regards to the larger 
groups, is difficult. Obviously not every group meets the organization 
  
 220. Id. at 7–8. 
 221. Id. at 8. 
 222. Syria: ICRC Urges Full Respect for International Humanitarian Law, ICRC 
(Apr. 8, 2012), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2012/syria-
news-2012-07-31.htm. 
 223. Syria’s Assad: “We Live in a Real State of War”, CBS NEWS (June 26, 2012, 
10:16 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/syrias-assad-we-live-in-a-real-state-of-war/. 
 224. See generally Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Appeal 
on Final Judgement, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
 225. See Syria Crisis: Where Key Countries Stand, BBC (Dec. 13, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23849587. 
 226. See generally ARIMATSU & CHOUDHURY, supra note 216, at 4. 
 227. Guide to the Syrian Rebels, BBC (Dec. 13, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24403003. 
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criteria. However, there is enough information concerning ISIS and FSA 
to analyze the organizational element.  
In many important respects, ISIS fights more like a state actor than an 
insurgent group. It holds territory and conducts coordinated military 
operations across large portions of northern Syria and  central Iraq.228 
ISIS draws fighters from across the globe with recruits from 
approximately 74 countries.229 A report from 2015 stated that ISIS was 
believed to have a fighting force exceeding thirty thousand.230 Under the 
overall leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS has developed a 
complex administrative and governance structure.231 At the top of ISIS’s 
military command structure is al-Baghdadi and two deputies both of 
them formerly serving as senior military leaders in Saddam Hussein’s 
military.232 ISIS has a number of trained, capable former Iraqi military 
leaders filling its ranks233 and are using captured “U.S.-supplied 
equipment, . . . [such as] tanks, artillery, armored Humvees, and mine-
resistant vehicles[,]”234 in their well-coordinated military campaign. By 
almost any metric, ISIS meets the organization requirements to be a party 
to an armed conflict as it is more akin to a “pseudo-state led by a 
conventional army” than a rebel group.235 
  
 228. Ben Hubbard & Eric Schmitt, Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel 
Success of ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/ 
world/middleeast/army-know-how-seen-as-factor-in-isis-successes.html. 
 229. Somini Sengupta, Nations Trying to Stop Their Citizens From Going to 
Middle East to Fight for ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/world/middleeast/isis-recruits-prompt-laws-against-
foreign-fighters.html?_r=0 (noting that the ISIS governance structure includes deputy 
positions, a cabinet, governors, and legislative bodies). 
 230. Robert Windrem, ISIS by the Numbers: Foreign Fighter Total Keeps 
Growing, NBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2015, 8:50 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-
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 231. Nick Thompson & Atika Shubert, The Anatomy of ISIS: How the ‘Islamic 
State’ Is Run, From Oil to Beheadings, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/18/world/ 
meast/isis-syria-iraq-hierarchy/ (last updated Jan. 14, 2015, 9:11 AM). 
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Won’t Stop the Latest Jihadist Threat, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
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While the FSA is not as sophisticated as ISIS, it still seems to meet 
the prerequisite organizational criteria. Originally formed in Turkey and 
led by Col Riad al-Asaad236 the group acts as an umbrella of secularist 
rebel forces primarily consisting of Syrian army deserters.237 The FSA 
does not operate as unified armed forces but instead as a loosely 
affiliated coalition of groups.238 As mentioned above, FSA is composed 
of thousands of fighters, has a fairly structured chain of command, and 
many of the groups pledge their loyalty to the 30-Supreme Military 
Council. 239 The military council was formed, in part, because of external 
pressure from Qatar and Saudi Arabia, who promised more advanced 
weapons once the rebels had a more central command structure.240 Due to 
the military council, the FSA is generally well-armed, financed, and 
trained by a number of state actors including the United States. Based 
upon these facts, it is fair to conclude that the FSA satisfies many of the 
assessment factors with respect to the nature and degree of its 
organization.241   
 
Due to the sustained nature of the armed violence coupled with the 
level of organization of some of the anti-governmental armed groups it is 
clear that a non-international armed conflict currently exists in Syria. 
This assessment is corroborated by both a report by the United Nations 
Council on Human Rights (UNCHR)—stating “the intensity and duration 
  
 236. See Guide to the Syrian Rebels, supra note 227. 
 237. Elliot Friedland & Serabian, Who’s Who in the Syrian Civil War, THE 
CLARION PROJECT 20 (Feb. 20, 2017), https://clarionproject.org/whos-who-in-the-syrian-
civil-war/. 
 238. Id. at 21. 
 239. Id. at 20. 
 240. Id. 
 241. While this paper only analyzes the organizational criteria for ISIS and the 
FSA other non-state actors, such as al-Sham and the Kurds, also most likely meet the 
organizational factors. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Indep. Int’l 
Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic on Its Twenty-Seventh Session, ¶ 25–
33, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/69 (Feb. 5, 2015) (noting that then al-Nusra had 
“flourished…owing to their operational efficiency and stable financial capacity”); Raja 
Abdulrahim & Dion Nissenbaum, Kurds Carve Out a Home in Syria, Testing U.S. Ties 
with Turkey, WALL. ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2016, 1:31 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/syrias-
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(stating that the Kurds control an areas with four million people and have established 
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of the conflict, combined with the increased organizational capabilities of 
anti-Government armed groups, had met the legal threshold for a non-
international armed conflict”242—and findings of the ICRC.243 In 
actuality, there are multiple non-international armed conflicts as the 
fighting is no longer exclusively between the Syrian government and 
anti-government groups, but also includes protracted violence between 
various organized non-state armed actors.244 The collapse of the Syrian 
state has created a void filled by many sophisticated non-state actors with 
various motives. Often these groups are in conflict.245 For example, 
recently the Kurdish backed Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) successfully 
completed a violent urban battle with ISIS for the Syrian city of 
Manbij.246 While the proliferation of non-international armed conflicts in 
Syria does mean the substantive protections and obligations of the 
relevant law apply to a greater spectrum of groups, it does not change the 
overall characterization of the hostilities.  
B.  How About an International Armed Conflict?  
But is it also possible to classify the Syrian hostilities as an 
international armed conflict? While a number of global powers are 
  
 242. U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on 
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94-1-A, Decision on Appeal on Final Judgement, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). See also Gill, supra note 214, at 374–76 (stating there exists 
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 245. For example, Kurdish groups seem to be creating a pseudo-state in Northern 
Syria and Iraq, Abdulrahim & Nissenbaum, supra note 241, while ISIS has openly 
claimed a new state in the form of the caliphate. See generally Graeme Wood, What ISIS 
Really Wants, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/ 
2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/. 
 246. See, e.g., Updated: SDF Declares Victory in Manbij, ISIS Flees with 2,000 
Civilian Human Shields, RUDAW (Dec. 8, 2016), http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/ 
syria/120820162. 
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involved in Syria—including the United States, Russia, Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia, Israel, Iran, among others—the state actors have generally 
avoided confrontation. There are a few notable exceptions, however. 
Israel and Syria remain locked in an international armed conflict that 
began in 1967 and has resulted in the continual belligerent occupation of 
the Golan Heights for the last forty years.247 Israel has quietly conducted 
strikes against both the Syrian regime and non-state armed groups since 
the 2011 violence began.248 Additionally, the Turkish-Syrian border has 
been the scene of multiple air engagements—first between Syria and 
Turkey in 2012,249 and then between Turkey and Russia in 2015.250 While 
any of these engagements meet the requisite criteria to trigger an 
international armed conflict, the involved states have avoided escalating 
violence and, in the situation of Turkey and Russia, have gone so far as 
to give an apology for the incident.251  
Most recently, the decision by the U.S. to directly target a Syrian 
airbase has significantly changed the classification of hostilities within 
the Syrian conflict.  Although the unilateral strike was limited in both 
scope and duration, it does reach the low threshold of hostilities for an 
Article 2 conflict.  The U.S. resorted to the use of armed force against 
Syria, triggering the commonly-understood criteria for an international 
armed conflict.252  The ICRC agrees, confirming that the situation in 
Syria with respect to the U.S. constitutes an international armed 
conflict.253     
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Aside from these notable exceptions, most state actors involved have 
made conscious efforts to avoid state-on-state hostilities. Instead, 
external state actors seem interested in influencing the various conflicts 
by providing support to either the Syrian regime or non-state actors. 
Russia and Iran are the most ardent supporters of the Assad 
government254 but their assistance to a state actor fighting a rebel group 
does not change the characterization of the conflict.255 In contrast, a host 
of other nations are undoubtedly supporting non-state armed groups—
including both anti-government rebels and those opposing jihadists—in 
Syria.256 This assistance has included providing weapons, military 
training, financial support, and even air strikes.257 It is important to 
reiterate that providing assistance is not enough to “internationalize” a 
non-international armed conflict; a state is required to have “overall 
control” of the rebel group.258 State practice has shown that the overall 
control threshold is high and the evidence in support of such control must 
be compelling.259 Yet there is no evidence that any participating state is 
directing or planning the military actions of these groups. On the 
contrary, the non-governmental groups in Syria are seemingly 
independent actors. As no state currently is exercising a sufficiently high 
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“internationalized” when a State intervenes on the side of a non-state armed group. See 
supra notes 192-198 and accompanying text. As Russia and Iran are supporting the State 
actor in the Syrian civil war their participation does not change the characterization. See 
Dinstein, supra note 162, at 412. Professor Dinstein notes: “If State B forcibly intervenes 
on behalf of the central government of State A against the insurgents, the armed conflict 
still qualifies as a NIAC—even when State B deploys in State A an expeditionary force 
engaged in intense hostilities against the insurgents—inasmuch as the troops of State B 
are not battling another State, but operating jointly with that other State (State A) to quell 
the insurgency.” Id. However, “State B cannot dispatch troops into State A—in order to 
fight the insurgents within the latter’s territory—against the will of the host government.” 
Id. In other words, Syria must give consent to Russia and Iran to participate on their 
behalf in the ongoing civil war. 
 256. See supra notes 62–95 and accompanying text. 
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level of control over these groups, “internationalization” of the non-
international armed conflict in Syria through rebel groups has not taken 
place.  
C. So What Type of Armed Conflict Exists in Syria Again? 
The Syrian hostilities are primarily non-international armed conflicts, 
with the exception of the U.S. and Syria, which are now involved in an 
international armed conflict. The long-running international armed 
conflict between Israel and Syria can also not be ignored, nor can the 
violence on the Turkish border.260 The hostilities are therefore best 
characterized as parallel conflicts; international and non-international 
armed conflicts simultaneously occurring within Syria. Through this 
conflict classification paradigm it is possible to determine the applicable 
law as it relates to the various groups. Thus, while the vast majority of 
those involved in Syria will fall under the less comprehensive regulatory 
legal framework that governs non-international armed conflicts,261 some 
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Commentaries, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ 
WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P (last visited Sept. 4, 2016). Accordingly, as a non-
international armed conflict, only Common Article 3 and customary law would apply to 
the situation in Syria. 
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participating actors will have the entirety of the law of armed conflict 
apply to their actions.262   
VI. CONCLUSION 
The relentless violence in Syria continues with a level of brutality and 
carnage that seems to know no rational limits. Of course, characterizing 
the Syrian conflict will not change this unfortunate truth. However, only 
by providing legal clarity is it possible to eventually protect the victims 
of the conflict and hold accountable perpetrators of war crimes. While 
this may be of little consolation to those currently enduring through the 
Syrian conflict, it is a critical first step to ensuring the war stops its 
downward spiral into unchecked savagery.  
 
  
 262. Most notably, the hostilities between the U.S. and Syria make both countries 
accountable under the more robust set of rules for international armed conflicts.  This 
means, for example, that personnel detained in the course of hostilities between these two 
nations would get Prisoner of War status under the Geneva Conventions. See Geneva 
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4, August 12, 1949.   
